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____________________________________________________________________________________ 
This paper has served as input for a science-politics roundtable, held on 10 April 2019 in The Hague, the 
Netherlands.     
Disclaimer:  
The paper originates from an email exchange, rooted in societal debate about pricing pollution in several 
scientific and science-policy oriented circles in the Netherlands.  After a framework for a new Climate 
Law had been designed at the end of 2018, a societal discussion has followed how to include industry, or 
in general any economic sector, in future climate policy in the Netherlands. In 2019, national legislation 
is prepared in the Netherlands on the design of a national carbon levy. An email exchange 
started, temporary and oriented at the specific topic of a carbon levy and the carbon leakage problem. A 
newspaper letter, discussion about (political) motions, and email letters led to the initiative for a small, 
time-bound roundtable discussion in the spring of 2019, in the Dutch Parliament in The Hague. This 
roundtable is the purpose of this paper.  
The paper does not serve any other purpose and should be read in light of the limited timeframe to write 
down a short discussion note, with the insights readily available in the week(s) before the roundtable 
discussion between scientists and politicians. The paper is written as a working paper for a focussed, 
substantive dialogue between a small group of scientists and members of parliament, in an ad-hoc 
roundtable about policy options for taxing greenhouse gas emissions in 2019. This paper is written to 
explore options of designing a national Carbon Levy or ‘CO2 tax’ instrument, the expected Carbon 
Leakage effects, and explore what can be done about these expected leakage effects and responses in the 
international and domestic markets. The principles and advices are written on the basis of personal 
expertise, overview and insight over recently published empirical studies, acknowledging bounded 
rationality and fundamental differences between the nature of scientific debate and political debate. The 
scientists have written this paper for contributing to the knowledge base of political decision-making for 
the national policy regime on greenhouse gas emissions in the Netherlands. This paper is neither based on 
grants nor other types of funding.  
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Abstract 
This paper is written for an ad-hoc roundtable of economic and governance scientists, to advice politics, 
in spring 2019. The objective of this working paper is: The design of a national Carbon Levy and the 
expected Carbon Leakage effect and what can be done about this. With this paper, scientists aim to advice 
politics on the design and implementation of a carbon tax in the Netherlands. This text is originally 
written as a discussion letter, serving as input for an informal roundtable with a small society of scientists 
and politicians. This exploratory science-policy roundtable has been held on 10 April 2019 in the Dutch 
Parliament, with nine people around the table, half senior & half junior, half science & half political 
representatives. This paper forms the input, discussing a few options and consequences, in order to 
explore the ‘space’ for political and economic maneuverings into a future pathway that is consistent with 
climate science and with international agreements (the Paris Climate Agreement), as well as a  feasible 
pathway in the current global and European market context and in the actual national political 
constellation.  
The roundtable serves to gain understanding across the boundaries of scientific circles and political 
systems, communicating both theoretical and practical insights. A diverse set of ingredients, both market-
based and politics-based, limit the scope and feasibility of options for action, marking a significant divide 
between what is theoretically desirable and what is currently practically and politically possible, given the 
realities of a fragmented political landscape and polarized political viewpoints regarding climate change 
policy in the current timeframe. The roundtable is meant to deliberate the latest empirical analyses on the 
topic of taxing greenhouse gas emissions (expressed as CO2-equivalent tonnes), and learn from each 
other first-handedly about actual imperfect circumstances. The roundtable has been held after a party-
internal motion on the topic of installing a CO2 tax had been accepted within one of the larger democratic 
political parties in the Netherlands. The paper contains a Dutch summary, principles and execution 
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Summary in Dutch (Samenvatting in het Nederlands)  
 
Korte samenvatting van hoe economen naar een CO2 heffing kijken. 
I. Prikkels op bedrijfsniveau. 
1. Economen willen graag dat elke ton CO2 die een bedrijf kan besparen hetzelfde voordeel oplevert voor 
het bedrijf. Dit heet marginale beprijzing. 
a. Dat betekent dat er geen vrijstelling is waaronder de CO2 ongeprijst is voor een bedrijf! 
b. Als een bedrijf een emissie-vrijstelling heeft, dan is het de bedoeling dat het bedrijf geld toe krijgt bij 
lagere emissies! 
c. Empirisch onderzoek laat zien dat echte prijsprikkels systematisch meer resultaat opleveren (meer 
reductie) voor lagere kosten dan afspraken met bedrijven op basis van expert-opinies (onderhandelen over 
doelen en vergoedingen). Bijv. kosten van milieumaatregelen vallen lager uit dan vooraf gedacht als 
bedrijven moeten concurreren om deze maatregelen te mogen nemen tegen een vergoeding. 
2. De vrijstelling van CO2 emissies moet objectief zijn en gebonden zijn aan de schaal van de 
bedrijfsvoering. Dit heet evidence-based conditioneel terugsluizen. 
a. Een bedrijf mag geen vrijstelling houden als het de poorten sluit. 
b. De mate van terugsluizen mag geen onderdeel worden van onderhandelingen waarbij het bedrijf een 
informatievoorsprong heeft. 
c. Beiden kunnen worden bereikt door dezelfde output-maat te gebruiken als de EU. 
3. Een vrijstelling moet alleen gegeven worden als het bedrijf zware internationale concurrentie 
ondervindt. De combinatie van marginale beprijzing en conditioneel terugsluizen zorgt ervoor dat de 
totale kosten voor de bedrijven in Nederland niet zo sterk stijgen, zodat ze niet naar het buitenland 
vertrekken. Tegelijkertijd zorgt het er voor dat de bedrijven wel hun best doen om elke ton CO2 te 
verminderen. 
a. Zoveel als mogelijk moeten de inkomsten uit CO2 heffingen teruggegeven worden aan de hele 
economie door andere belastingen te verlagen. Rondpompen van geld kost geld. 
b. Het idee van marginaal versus gemiddelde kosten vinden veel mensen moeilijk te begrijpen, een 
voorbeeld kan verhelderen. Stel dat bij de huidige technologie voor elke ton staal 0.5 ton CO2 nodig is. 
Stel, we weten dat de emissies met 40% omlaag moeten. Stel, de prijs van CO2 zetten we op 40 euro/ton, 
en we combineren dat met een vrijstelling van 0.3 ton CO2 per ton staal. Dat betekent dat als de fabriek 
zonder innovaties blijft draaien, dat het dan over 0.2 ton CO2 x 40 eur = 8 euro moet betalen per ton staal. 
Als de fabriek een nieuwe technologie gebruikt die maar 0.2 ton CO2 uitstoot per ton staal, krijgt de 
fabriek 0.1 ton CO2 x 40 euro = 4 euro per ton staal dat het produceert als negatieve (!) CO2 belasting. 
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4. Een subsidie voor de onrendabele top bij innovatieve investeringen (SDE++) is wenselijk als er de 
verwachting is dat deze type investeringen in de toekomst voor andere bedrijven wel rendabel zullen zijn. 
II. Verdeling over de economie. 
5. Economen willen graag dat er een vloer is over de hele economie voor de (marginale) CO2 prijs. Dus 
geen uitzonderingen voor glastuinbouw, landbouw, enz. De ETS-sectoren betalen dan alleen het verschil 
met de ETS prijs. 
a. Een verschillende prijs voor verschillende sectoren betekent dat de ene sector veel harder de best doet 
dan een andere sector. Dat is verspilling van inspanning. 
b. Voor ETS sectoren kan de ETS prijs worden afgetrokken van de vloerprijs. 
6. Het niveau van de CO2 prijs moet dynamisch worden aangepast aan of de doelstellingen bereikt 
worden. 
a. Als NL achterblijft bij de doelstellingen moet de prijs omhoog. 
7. De terugsluis en SDE++ kunnen worden aangepast op basis van het niveau van nieuwe investeringen 
door de energie-intensieve industrie. 
a. Als de industrie niet investeert in schone nieuwe capaciteit, is een ruimere SDE++ nodig. 
III. Conclusie. 
Een economie-brede CO2 heffing, met objectieve richtlijnen voor terugsluizen voor alleen de industrie 
die zware internationale concurrentie ondervindt, het gebruik van een beperkt SDE++ instrument, en 






1. Principles for a Dutch GHG levy on industrial facilities 
 
Note: The terminology of (Scientific) Principles and Execution are used, in order to make readers see 
where execution proposals come from, rather than directly aiming at practical outcomes.  
 
Principle 1: Inclusion in Climate Law, unit in Euros per tonne CO2-equivalents 
 The Dutch GHG levy is part of the Dutch Climate Law. Its level is set in euros per tCO2-equivalents, and 
decided consistently with the targets specified in the Climate Law. 
Principle 2: Price alignment across sectors 
The Dutch GHG levy is meant to align the marginal costs of reducing greenhouse gas emissions more 
consistently across sectors and with the levels needed to achieve the targeted reductions at lowest social 
costs. The GHG levy does not aim at complete harmonization.  
Principle 3: Design of GHG levy with appropriate measures that reduce carbon 
leakage  
The Dutch GHG levy will be designed with appropriate measures that reduce carbon leakage (which is an 
increase in foreign emissions caused by a domestic decrease). The GHG levy does not aim at complete 
neutralization of carbon leakage. Nor does the Dutch GHG levy with its related measures aim to protect 
specific sectors for reasons other than avoiding carbon leakage and enhancing that the environmental 
effectiveness of the carbon pricing policy. 
Principle 4: No cross-interference of GHG levy with use of other policy instruments   
The Dutch GHG levy does not interfere with the use of other instruments, either sector-specific or not, 
such as fuel taxes and house building regulation. 
Principle 5. Minimize administrative costs and strategic behavior by firms 
The Dutch GHG levy aims at minimizing administrative costs as well as strategic behavior by firms. For 
this purpose, it uses as much as possible the same data as used by the EU-ETS for its implementation, for 




2. Execution guidance for implementing the principles in 
policy practice   
 
Execution 1: Price stability  
The Dutch GHG levy level is determined 5 years in advance, so as to enable firms to anticipate. The level 
determined for after 5 years is decided with the aim to achieve the targets as set in the Climate Law. 
(Lower projected emissions as compared to the target imply lower levy, while higher projected emissions 
imply a higher levy.) 
Execution 2: Price alignment  
The Dutch GHG levy sets a minimum effective price, a so called ‘floor’ in the Dutch GHG market. Some 
sectors —primarily outside the industrial sectors/ETS sectors— have higher effective GHG prices, e.g. 
due to fuel taxes, in which case the GHG levy does not apply to that sector. (Thus, if the fuel tax already 
internalizes all external effects to a proper level, including CO2-equivalent emissions, other 
environmental effects and congestion, then there is no extra GHG levy applicable.) 
 
Scope of the levy: if designed as an economy-wide minimum price, some installations not covered by the 
EU ETS may be covered nonetheless by the levy.  
See for instance the EU ETS Handbook on small emitting facilities: ‘Installations where the emissions are 
so small that the administrative costs per unit of emissions might be disproportionately high are allowed 
to opt-out from the EU ETS as long as they are subject to equivalent measures. Installations are 
considered small emitters if they emit less than 25 ktCO2e annually and, if they are combustion 
installations, have a thermal rated input below 35MW.’ (EU ETS Handbook) 
Execution 3: Avoid double-taxation 
All installations covered by the EU-ETS are subject to a reduced Dutch GHG levy. The reduced level is 
such that the EU-ETS price, averaged over the 12 months prior to 1 July the year before, plus the reduced 
GHG levy, equals the floor GHG price set for facilities not covered by the EU-ETS. 
Execution 4: Address carbon leakage 
All installations in sectors identified as energy-intensive and trade-exposed (EITE) under the EU-ETS 
shall receive commensurate treatment to prevent carbon leakage.[1] The benchmarks for free allocation 
under the EU-ETS are a logical starting point for designing objective and transparent criteria and 
minimizing administrative costs.[2] These benchmarks can be used to design tax refunds in accordance 
with EU State Aid Guidelines.[3] Although those guidelines allow a reduced tax rate for qualifying 
sectors, the environmental objectives are better preserved by maintaining the strong carbon price signal 
and using tax rebates based on a measure of current or historical output, rather than emissions.[4] 
Option 1: Each facility will be assigned “benchmark emissions,” as calculated by the EU benchmark 
rate multiplied by the facility’s total production, either in the previous year or in the most recent base 
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year used in the ETS.[5] For EITE-designated facilities, the basis for the levy shall be the total 
verified emissions in excess of their benchmark emissions; if verified emissions fall below the 
benchmark, a levy credit shall be issued. 
For installations covered by the EU ETS, the reduced levy will be applied to this same basis. 
Equivalently, at the end of the year, qualifying facilities will be given a tax refund equal to their 
benchmark emissions multiplied by their relevant levy rate. 
A common adjustment factor can be applied to ensure that total benchmark emissions do not exceed 
80% of the total verified emissions attributed to the EITE installations in the prior year. 
Option 2: If the levy is only applied to installations covered under the EU ETS, actual EU ETS free 
allowance allocations can be used to calculate the tax basis or tax refund. While simple, this method 
has some limitations: First, it does not work for uncovered firms, like small installations. Second, free 
allocation under the EU ETS faces several adjustments from the benchmarks that lead to reduced 
allocations, and the resulting compensation may be inadequate to address leakage, especially given 
the added potential for internal EU leakage that a unilateral levy can generate. 
Option 3: The benchmark rate could be used as the basis for setting a performance standard, for 
which compliance would be tradable. In this case, facilities are awarded credits equal to the 
benchmark rate per unit of current production. Those with verified emissions below their benchmark 
emissions can sell credits to entities with emissions above the standard. The carbon levy rate would 
serve as a ceiling for the tradable credit prices.[6] If the benchmarks are ambitious, one would expect 
the carbon levy rate to prevail. This kind of market-based regulation is likely to satisfy State Aid 
exemptions for equivalent effects while retaining the output-based-updating feature. However, if both 
EU ETS covered and uncovered facilities participate, some thought is required to avoid both double 
counting and tax arbitrage. 
  
Some additional options deviate further from the EU ETS free allocation strategy. Although border 
carbon adjustment is not an option for the Netherlands on its own, it could be mimicked by combining 
output-based rebating for domestic covered facilities plus a carbon-based consumption tax on those 
products.[7] 
Another option is to use part of the revenues to support investments required to switch to low-carbon 
production methods.[8] If costs are lumpy, conditioning refunds on such investments can encourage 
emission reductions and lessen leakage (since post-investment, marginal production costs will be less 
sensitive to carbon prices). If low-carbon production raises marginal production costs, however, output-
based rebating more directly offsets leakage. This may inform SDE++ design.  
Finally, some consideration should be given to whether any sectors not deemed EITE under the EU ETS, 
due to limited competition outside the EU, may in fact be subject to carbon leakage within the EU to 
producers in other member states. Electricity is an example.[9] Analysis should be done to see if any 




[1] See Annex II of the ETS State Aid Guidelines, OJ C 158, 5.6.2012, p. 4. 
[2] 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/ets/allowances/docs/p4_gd2_allocation_methodologies_en.pdf 
[3] State Aid Guidelines state that aid in the form of reductions in or exemptions from environmental 
taxes are allowed either by a reduced rate or a fixed refund based on a historical base year provided; 
explicit output-based rebating thus does not seem provided for, although it has been used in the past (e.g., 
Sweden’s NOx tax). Additional restrictions are that the beneficiaries must pay at least 20% of the national 
tax and not pay below the Union minimum tax level set by the relevant applicable Directive [in this case, 
perhaps, the EU ETS liability]. Alternatively, the tax reduction must be made conditional on agreements 
to achieve equivalent reductions. 
[4] See, e.g., Fischer, Carolyn (2015) “Options for avoiding carbon leakage”, Chapter 21 in Towards a 
Workable and Effective Climate Regime, edited by Scott Barrett, Carlo Carraro, Jaime de Melo.   
https://voxeu.org/sites/default/files/file/fischer.pdf 
[5] The latter would promote alignment with the EU ETS and certainly satisfy State Aid Guidelines; the 
former, however, is likely more effective at combatting leakage, as the updating provides an inducement 
to production. 
[6] A similar scheme has been used in the Canadian province of Alberta. 
[7] Neuhoff, K., R. Ismer, W. Acworth, A. Ancygier, C. Fischer, M. Haussner, H.-L. Kangas, Y.-G. Kim, 
C. Munnings, A. Owen, S. Pauliuk, O. Sartor, M. Sato, J. Stede, T. Sterner, M. Tervooren, R. Tusveld, R. 
Wood, Z. Xiliang, L. Zetterberg, and V. Zipperer. 2016. Inclusion of Consumption of carbon intensive 
materials in emissions trading – An option for carbon pricing post-2020. Berlin: Climate Strategies. 
[8] Under State Aid Guidelines, eligible costs for aid include “the additional investment costs necessary to 
go beyond the level of environmental protection required by the Union standards,:” or in the absence of 
such standards, “the investment costs necessary to achieve a higher level of environmental protection than 
that which the undertaking or undertakings in question would achieve in the absence of any 
environmental aid.” (Annex 2) 








Discussion points on Execution 4, address carbon leakage 
Discussion about rebate mechanism:  
CF: Involving a consistent minimum price, proposed here is that all companies get the same EU ETS-
based benchmarks. All pay the minimum tax rate, but for the ETS firms their tax rate is a top-up. Both 
ETS-firms and other firms get a rebate equal to their benchmark emissions times their tax rate. For the 
ETS firms, the Dutch tax rebate will be lower because they pay a lower rate. However their total tax and 
total rebate will be about the same, because it combines the Dutch levy and ETS free allocation values. If 
double taxation of ETS firms is proposed (no tax rate offset to reflect allowance prices) then their rebate 
should be based on the full rate. In total they will pay more on the margin but on average be full (or 80%) 
compensated for the embodied emissions costs. 
About benchmarking and free allocation or Output-Based Allocation to combat leakage: 
CF: If all ‘large industries in the Netherlands’  are already covered by the ETS, then the benchmarking 
has already been done, and that can be a starting point for free allocation or Output-Based Allocation 
(OBA) with more frequent updating. That way the value of their free allocation, which is intended to 
combat leakage, will increase commensurate with the emissions price increase. Since this is a tax rebate 
rather than an allowance allocation, though, will need to check state aid rules, but it does follow the spirit 
of the EU method. (One could also achieve the same thing with a tradable performance standard with a 
safety valve at the levy price). 
 
3. Other matters of concern for implementing a Carbon tax 
in the Netherlands 
Consideration 1: Safeguarding low income groups 
It is a political (distribution) consideration, but it may be a good idea for the acceptability of this levy in 
society, to compensate lower income groups if they are affected by higher taxes or higher costs of primary 
living standards and necessary monthly costs (housing rent, energy bills, etc.).  
Consideration 2: Distribution of costs of the energy transition 
On the topic of distributing the costs of the energy transition between households and business sectors, we 
should realize that so far, the Electricity sector has received huge subsidies through the SDE+ 
arrangement. From recent news coming from the ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate, we 
understand that a new SDE++ arrangement for the industry is in the making, and to be expected as part of 
the Carbon levy plans. This means that in the end, the industry will not really pay, they will not pay more 
than what they get back… This is an interesting question, but difficult to discuss without the details of 
plans for the SDE++ arrangement. If we could get information about ideas of government to design the 
SDE++ arrangement, economists could study its possible impacts ex-ante… 
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Consideration 3: Research needed to determine impact on low-income consumers 
Given the chosen design, analysis should be performed to determine the impact on low-income 
consumers and potentially displaced workers. Note that EITE industries are by definition unable to pass 
through substantial cost increases, and compensation strategies further offset their incentive to do so, in 
which case large consumer impacts are not expected (and those tax revenues are already largely foregone 
due to refunding). For non-EITE sectors, tax revenues can be used to address adverse distributional 
effects. (However, for these non-EITE sectors, with output-based rebating, or with strong international 
competitions, the price impacts for consumers may also be limited, so less redistribution is then required 
from an industrial levy.)  
Consideration 4: Societal support for climate policy  
Societal support for climate policy has not been addressed directly in this discussion letter. In order to 
keep support for climate related policy interventions, it is necessary not only to focus on economic 
systems and (major) firms and carbon emitting installations, but also to look at the wider public, wider 
perspectives and discourses about climate policy, and communication and representation aspects. Some 
political parties spread a message that carbon policy is expensive and does not matter for the 
environment. Although this argument can be de-masked, it still sticks in people’s minds after framing 
climate policies in this way.  
A carbon tax as price signal represents a symbolic message that polluting will be taxed by government, 
that pollution-reduction will be made worthwhile in a new fiscal regime, and that businesses will be made 
accountable for paying their share for environmental pollution.  Measures to prevent leakage are part of 
the transition, but these measures may feel somewhat ‘unjust’.  
Moreover, it could be debated that measures protecting emission-intensive industries (such as leakage 
measures) may protect jobs and industries that otherwise would relocate on the short term, but these 
leakage measures may hinder (new) climate-innovative firms in the long run. 
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4. Glossary of concepts and its explanations  
Concept 1. Effective carbon rate (ECR)  
From OECD (2018), Effective Carbon Rates 2018: Pricing Carbon Emissions Through Taxes and 
Emissions Trading. 
Effective carbon rates are the total price that applies to CO2 emissions from energy use as a result of 
market-based policy instruments. They are the sum of taxes and tradable emission permit prices, and have 
three components:   
1. carbon taxes, which typically set a tax rate on energy based on its carbon content,   
2. specific taxes on energy use (primarily excise taxes), which are typically set per physical unit or 
unit of energy, but which can be translated into effective tax rates based on the carbon content of 
each form of energy, and   
3. the price of tradable emission permits, regardless of the permit allocation method, representing 
the opportunity cost of emitting an extra unit of CO2.  
The effective carbon rate measures how policies change the relative price of CO2 emissions from energy 
use.  
 
Figure 1.Components of effective carbon rates Source: OECD (2016) Effective Carbon Rates: Pricing 
CO2 through Taxes and Emissions Trading Systems, OECD Publishing, Paris, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264260115-en.  
From: OECD (2018), Effective Carbon Rates 2018: Pricing Carbon Emissions Through Taxes and 
Emissions Trading, OECD Publishing, Paris. https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264305304-en. 
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Concept 2. EITE sectors 
Sectors identified as energy-intensive and trade-exposed (EITE) under the EU-ETS .  
Concept 3. Output-Based Allocation (OBA) and Output-Based Rebating (OBR) 
Output-based allocation (OBA) or output-based rebating (OBR) is a method of allocating the allowance 
values (in an emissions credit trading program) or refunding emissions revenues (in the case of a tax) 
back to affected firms in proportion to their output. This basis for allocation is updated regularly 
according to actual output, not based on a fixed historical measure. “Since more output generates more 
rebates, the rebate functions like a subsidy to output of EITE firms, signalling that emissions reductions 
should not be sought through reductions in output (since that would result in leakage). The advantage 
relative to exemptions is that OBR retains the carbon price incentive to reduce emissions intensity. 
However, it does come at a cost of muting the carbon price signal passed on to consumers, who then have 
less incentive to consume less energy-intensive products or find cleaner alternatives.”[1] 
OBR is thus used for sectors that, due to international competition, are severely limited in their ability to 
past on carbon cost increases, as a means to avoid loss of competitiveness vis-à-vis trade partners lacking 
similar carbon pricing.  OBA has been used in New Zealand’s cap-and-trade system. OBR is being used 
for energy intensive industries in certain Canadian provinces, including Alberta, Ontario, and in the 
federal carbon backstop pricing plan. Sweden used output-based refunding of NOx emissions taxes to 
garner support for a much higher tax than would otherwise have been acceptable. OBR may be 
considered a form of state aid, but according to the guidelines, “While reductions in or exemptions from 
environmental taxes may adversely impact that objective (76), such an approach may nonetheless be 
needed where the beneficiaries would otherwise be placed at such a competitive disadvantage that it 
would not be feasible to introduce the environmental tax in the first place.”[2]  
Tradable performance standards are another form of OBR. The intent of any OBR system is to encourage 
meaningful GHG reductions by 2 mechanisms: 
1. Comparing facilities against their cohort of peers to encourage leaders. 
2. Sending a price signal to influence future investments. 
 
[1] Fischer (2015), supra note 5. 
[2] 3.7.1. (167) in EC 2014/C 200/01. 
Sources: 






Example of Alberta, Canada, has implemented OBA 
Output-based Allocation (OBA) is included in regulation for CO2 emission policy since January 2018.   
The Alberta OBA applies to:  
● facilities that are large emitters over 100,000 tonnes,  
● sectors and facilities that qualify to opt-in sectors that are emissions intensive and trade 
exposed. (or like for like)  
The intent of the OBA system is to encourage meaningful GHG reductions by 2 mechanisms:  
1. Comparing facilities against their cohort of peers to encourage leaders.  
2. Sending a price signal to influence future investments.  
OBA in Alberta provides free allocations to regulated sectors and facilities to minimize the risk of 
carbon leakage due to production moving from Alberta to jurisdictions without carbon pricing.  
Source: https://www.alberta.ca/assets/documents/CCI-OBA-presentation-Dec-2017.pdf  
 
About Output-based Rebating, a study on Canada - US neighbouring policy  
Christoph Böhringer, Brita Bye, Taran Fæhn, Knut Einar Rosendahl (2017) Output‐based rebating of 
carbon taxes in a neighbour's backyard: Competitiveness, leakage and welfare. First published: 10 May 
2017 https://doi.org/10.1111/caje.12264.  
Abstract (Christoph Böhringer et al’s paper on Output-based rebating of carbon taxes) 
We investigate how, in an open economy, carbon taxes combined with output‐based rebating (OBR) 
perform in interaction with the carbon policies of a large neighbouring trading partner. Analytical results 
suggest that, whether the purpose of the OBR policy is to compensate firms for carbon tax burdens or to 
maximize welfare (accounting for global emission reductions), the OBR rate should be positive in policy‐
relevant cases. Numerical simulations for Canada, with the US as the neighbouring trading partner, 
indicate that the impact of US policies on the OBR rate will depend crucially on the purpose of the 
Canadian OBR policies. If, for a given US carbon policy, Canada's aim is to restore the competitiveness 
of domestic emission‐intensive and trade‐exposed (EITE) firms to the same level as before the 
introduction of its own carbon taxation, we find that the necessary domestic OBR rates will be insensitive 
to the foreign carbon policies. However, if not only the Canadian carbon tax but also an equally high US 
tax is introduced, compensatory Canadian OBR rates will be up to 50% lower, depending on the sector 
and on US OBR policy. If the policy objective is to increase economy‐wide allocative efficiency (welfare) 
of Canadian policies by accounting for carbon leakage, the US policies will have only a minor downward 
pressure on desirable OBR rates in Canada. Practical choices of OBR rates hardly affect overall domestic 
14 
economic performance; thus, output‐based rebating qualifies as an instrument for compensating EITE 
industries without a large sacrifice in terms of economy‐wide allocative efficiency. 
Source: https://doi.org/10.1111/caje.12264.  
Concept 4. Output-Based Allocation plus Consumption Tax (OBA-CT) 
By subsidizing production, OBA mutes the pass-through of the carbon price signal to consumers. It 
generally should be applied when intense international competition limits that pass-through. In either 
case, when carbon cost pass-through is limited, consumers have insufficient incentives to reduce their 
consumption of the emissions-intensive good or to find alternatives. A consumption tax equal to the 
carbon levy multiplied by a benchmark emissions intensity can correct incentives for the consumers. 
Since the consumption tax is applied regardless of the product’s origin, it does not distort 
competitiveness. Used in combination, OBA addresses competitiveness-related carbon leakage while 
the consumption tax ensures pass-through of the carbon price signal. 
Source: http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/CS-Report.pdf 
 
Research Study on Output-Based Allocation plus Consumption Tax system (OBA-CT) 
Insights about this combination of policy instruments is, amongst others, based on the results from a 
game-theoretical economic simulation study by Kevin Raj Kaushal, Norwegian University of Life 
Sciences School of Economics and Business, Working Paper 08/2018. The paper is titled: Emission 
price, output-based allocation and consumption tax: Optimal climate policy in the presence of another 
country’s climate policy.   
The paper investigates an emission price, existing of output-based allocation and consumption tax. The 
modeling study seeks an optimal climate policy in the presence of another country’s climate policy, 
with help of examining the Nash equilibrium of a policy instrument game between regions who 
regulate their emissions separately. In the study, a case is investigated when a policymaker can choose 
to supplement her ETS with OBA and/or with a consumption tax, based on another policymaker’s 
optimal choice for her ETS. The two examined parties in this paper are the EU and China.   
Conclusion section from this study:  
“As rest of the world closely follows the unilateral initiatives by EU and China, the policymakers in 
these markets are well aware that their unilateral action leads to carbon leakage without a global 
initiative to reduce emissions. There are many different approaches in the economic literature to 
mitigate carbon leakage. A very common anti-leakage solution in emission trading systems is output 
based allocation (OBA) to emission-intensive and trade-exposed (EITE) industries. OBA, however, 
works as an implicit production subsidy to domestic production of EITE goods. Hence, an approach to 
supplement OBA with a consumption tax on all use of EITE goods have been proposed. In this paper we 
have examined the choice of a climate policy instrument for a region, in the presence of another 
region’s climate policy, applied to the EU and China. First we showed analytically that the effect on the 
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optimal OBA and optimal consumption tax for a country is ambiguous if another country introduces an 
OBA or a consumption tax. However, we also showed that under certain conditions the optimal 
consumption tax for a country is reduced, if another country introduces an OBA or a OBA and 
consumption tax. Next, we examined the choice of policy instrument for two separate countries with a 
stylized numerical model calibrated to real world data, where we considered the situation of the EU 
ETS and the Chinese ETS. The results showed that depending on certain conditions, the countries 
would choose different variation of policy combinations. In the context of maximizing welfare and 
minimizing leakage rate, both countries would implement a consumption tax on top of the OBA. 
Further, the numerical results showed that the strategies in all the Nash equilibrium outcomes were also 
the dominant strategy for the region. The tax implementing countries were consistently better off in 
terms of welfare and leakage rate. Thus, the paper conclude that complimenting output-based allocation 
with a consumption tax is likely a strong policy strategy to mitigate carbon leakage, even in the 
presence of other region’s climate policy.”  
Reference: Kaushal, Kevin Raj (2018) Emission price, output-based allocation and consumption tax: 
Optimal climate policy in the presence of another country’s climate policy. Norwegian University of 
Life Sciences School of Economics and Business, Working Papers no.8/2018. ISSN: 2464-1561. 
https://www.nmbu.no/download/file/fid/33498.  
 
Concept 5. SDE++ arrangement for the industry (in Dutch) 
SDE++: (in het Nederlands) De Stimuleringsregeling Duurzame Energieproductie (SDE+) zal met ingang 
van 2020 worden verbreed. De regeling zal zich gaan richten op CO2-reductie en zich niet meer beperken 
tot duurzame energieproductie. Doel van de SDE++ is om op een kosteneffectieve manier bij te dragen 
aan het bereiken van een emissiereductie van 49% in 2030. Net zoals in de huidige SDE+, zal de SDE++ 
technieken stimuleren door de onrendabele top te vergoeden. Het verschil is dat technieken in het vervolg 
concurreren op basis van ‘vermeden CO2’ (en andere broeikasgassen) in plaats van ‘opgewekte duurzame 
energie’. De technieken moeten, net als in de huidige SDE+, marktrijp zijn en grootschalig kunnen 
worden ingezet. Om concurrentie op CO2-reductie te stimuleren, zullen technieken die kosteneffectief 
CO2 reduceren, het eerst in aanmerking komen voor subsidie. De SDE++ wordt in samenspraak met 
marktpartijen, momenteel verder uitgewerkt. Hierbij wordt gekeken welke technieken in aanmerking 
komen, welke subsidiebedragen per techniek gelden en of er productie- of budgetplafonds wenselijk zijn.   
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